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Reading the Mindset of the Secretary of State: 
Shaping Policy Delivery Effectiveness 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the nature of the relationship between the Secretary of State and the 
Permanent Secretary, with particular focus on determining how policy delivery can be 
enhanced. The review of the literature offers insights into the role and tasks of the Secretary of 
State and Permanent Secretary, concluding that the quality of their relationship is central to 
effective policy delivery. The study reported in this paper surfaces the considerable attention 
given by public officials to understanding the Secretary of State in order to ensure for better 
engagement with their political masters. Towards this end, civil servants report that 
appreciating the Minister’s propensity for drawing on evidence (soft or hard data) and their 
level of personal confidence (feeling secure or insecure) provides for the necessary insights to 
‘get on to the Minister’s wavelength’. Officials report the extent of their flexibility to position 
arguments in order to win the Minister’s attention and approval. The paper concludes that the 
appropriate (or inappropriate) reading of the Minister is fundamental to enhancing (or 
damaging) policy delivery. The lengths officials go to so that the Secretary of State can, and 
can be seen to, appropriately deliver policy seemingly goes unrecognized by the Minister. 
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Reading the Mindset of the Secretary of State: 
Shaping Policy Delivery Effectiveness 
 
Introduction 
Traditionally civil servants have been considered as the Minister’s principal advisers and, at 
times, the only advisers on matters of policy and administrative reform, all for the purpose of 
‘increasing efficiency’ and ‘cutting costs’ whilst meeting the requirements of private 
individuals and ‘citizen consumers’ (Seddon, 2014). The act of every civil servant is by 
convention regarded, ‘as the act of his/her Minister’ (Jennings, 1952: 189–190). 
In recognition of its critical importance, the Minister–civil servant relationship has received 
scrutiny, particularly on the delineation of the various responsibilities of each party and the 
quality of interaction and relationship between the two (Morrison, 1954). Morrison (1954: 318–
319) identifies the relationship between the Minister and civil servant as one of partnership, 
shaped by the requirements of accountability in a democracy, ‘that of colleagues working 
together in a team, … on the understanding, of course, that the Minister’s decision is final…’. 
In order to provide continued efficient and energetic service, the additional values of integrity, 
fearlessness, and independence of thought and utterance in their private communication with 
Ministers were seen as ‘an essential principle in enlightened Government’ (Tomlin, 1931: 
1268, para. 12). 
Yet such prerequisites reflect a bygone era. The Minister–civil servant relationship, although 
critical, has undergone many changes (Jary, 2014). It has become more complex, particularly 
in the post-new public management (NPM) era, often referred to as New Public Governance 





accountability of officials is evident when delivering government policies. The NPG reforms, 
designed to strengthen the central political administrative levels through structural integration, 
have modified, but not transformed, this critical relationship (Christensen and Lægreid, 2012). 
Overall, NPG is in line with previous NPM reforms intensifying political control over the state 
and the erosion of bureaucratic hierarchies (Rhodes, 2016; Diamond, 2019; Peters, 2013; 
Aucoin, 2012). 
In the past, civil servants exercised considerable influence on public affairs within the 
constitutional, political, and practical limitations of their authority (Chapman, 2004; 
Theakston, 1999). In the 21st century government departments, under the care of the newly 
constituted departmental boards, chaired by relevant ministers and including non-executive 
directors (NEDs) drawn from business and public service entities, required civil servants to 
work with the Minister, with such boards and with special political advisers (SpAds) who 
become, at times, more influential than senior civil servants and even the Minister (Grube, 
2015). 
It is, therefore, no surprise that a number of studies have examined various aspects of the 
Permanent Secretary’s job in terms of gender, background, education (Richards, 1997; Greer 
and Jarman, 2010), the nature of the career experience, the number and length of working 
relationships with Secretaries of State (Ribbins and Sherratt, 2014), and tenure (Kogan, 1971; 
Theakston and Fry, 1989; Ribbins and Sherratt, 2014). In a similar vein, other studies have 
scrutinized various aspects of the ministerial role, the spread and shape of the ministerial office 
(Morrison, 1954; Brazier, 1997), the legislative impact of Peers (Cowley and Melhuish, 1997), 
the need for technical competence as a minister (Blondel, 1985), the junior ministers’ role 
(McMaster and Bairner, 2012), and the overall role and contribution of the Minister of the 





been pursued on how to work with ministers (Jary, 2014; Ribbins and Sherratt, 2014) and on 
how civil servants provide for relevant and politically sensitive policy advice (Cunnigham, 
1963; Bakvis, 1997). 
In this paper, we examine the nature of political–administrative interactions at the apex of the 
UK government from the perspective of efficient and effective policy delivery (Cooper, 2019). 
Our study examines the blockages, hindrances, and strengths of the Minister–civil servant 
relationship with particular focus on policy delivery. We examine how the Secretary of State 
and Permanent Secretary interact and ask how the various agendas in the policy delivery 
process are pursued. 
Attention is given to two different agendas in policy delivery: the urgency of the Minister to 
execute policy and the realistic appraisal undertaken by civil servants of the blockages and 
hindrances to be overcome in order to realize effective policy delivery.  Analysis of the thinking 
underlying Civil Service reforms, the role and contribution of the Secretary of State and 
Permanent Secretary, and the nature of their relationship are provided to set the scene for the 
study reported. This is followed by the findings of an in-depth qualitative investigation 
highlighting how reading the Minister’s mindset and emotional orientation are vital to 
positively engaging with the Secretary of State and winning their confidence. The paper 
concludes by identifying civil servant considerations to winning the Minister’s confidence in 
order to facilitate effective and efficient policy delivery. 
Impact of Civil Service Reforms  
Gladstone, in 1870, chose to professionalize the civil service by implementing the Northcote-
Trevelyan recommendations in order to create ‘neutral, permanent and anonymous officials 
motivated by the public interest; and a willingness to administer policies ultimately determined 





Weberian bureaucracy, remained essentially stable for a hundred years. However, in 1968 the 
Fulton Committee found civil service administrators as lacking in management skills. The 
system was reformed through unifying the grading system for all categories of staff, the 
creation of a Civil Service College and a central policy planning unit (The Fulton Report, 1968) 
and paved the way for the NPM movement of the 1980s. The NPM reforms transformed Public 
Administration from a core belief of public sector ethos and hierarchy as the means for 
resources allocation to that of efficiency, competition, and market mechanisms for resource 
allocation (Rhodes, 2016). Making the service-delivery aspects of government more ‘business-
like’ through establishment of various arms-length relationships highlighted the need for civil 
servants to ‘master the skills for managing the complex, nonroutine issues, policies, and 
relationships in networks’ (Rhodes, 2016: 641). 
With such considerations the then Minister for the Civil Service, Francis Maude (2009), desired 
a smaller, more motivated, flexible, and business-like Civil Service. Maude’s Civil Service 
Reform Plan (2012) recommended that Ministers have a ‘stronger role’ in the appointment of 
officials and Permanent Secretaries, and justified that by emphasizing the Ministers’ direct 
accountability to Parliament for the delivery of policy priorities (HM Government, 2012; 
Rhodes, 2016). In effect, Maude wanted the Civil Service to operate more like a private sector 
entity, with increased accountability and a more entrepreneurial culture.  
The ensuing Civil Service Reform Plan (HM Government, 2012) would have had far-reaching 
effects concerning the redefinition of the size and shape of the Civil Service and impact on 
civil servant career paths. Permanent Secretaries of delivery departments were expected to have 
at least two years’ experience in a commercial or operational role, in order that a better balance 
be struck between those who had an operational management background and those who 





Through his Reform Plan, Maude captured the sentiments held by certain Ministers towards 
civil servants: some felt they had limited control over the bureaucracy; others were undecided 
whether civil servant comment on Minister policy proposals was constructive advice or polite 
‘political sabotage’ (Bardach and Patashnik, 2015: 123). Yet, despite Maude’s exclamations, 
few Ministers interpreted the normal interdepartmental routines of policy delivery as 
obstructionist. On the contrary, a Freedom of Information (FOI) request found that the Cabinet 
Office had no records of such obstructionism (Paun et al, 2013: 12). In fact, civil servants have 
been criticized for being too accommodating to Ministers’ wishes (HC, 2007) and for not 
arguing with sufficient vigour against questionable policy proposals (Butler et al, 1994).  
Although some of Maude’s (2012) initiatives such as centralized control and greater functional 
integration have to some extent been implemented, his greatest radical transformation has been 
to facilitate the UK becoming the second largest public sector outsourcing market in the world 
(Smith and Jones, 2015). The creation of cross-government functions – digital, commercial, 
HR – to deliver common services to all departments was a critical contribution. 
Secretary of State  
Since the end of the 17th century, ministerial responsibility has become the cornerstone of the 
Westminster system. Being the most senior minister and head of a department and/or ministry, 
the Secretary of State usually sits in the Cabinet.1  
 
1 The term ‘Cabinet’ dates from pre-revolutionary France and was the inner part of King Louis' bedroom. Only 
the most senior government officials were allowed to enter the cabinet. In the UK, it developed from the Privy 
Council in the 17th and early 18th centuries. The term 'Kitchen Cabinet' was first used to describe the coterie of 
close friends and political allies that formed around Harold Wilson in his first term (led by Marcia Williams, later 
Lady Falkender). Increasingly since then, it has been used to refer to the Number 10 'machine' as distinct from the 





Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account for and to be held to account for the policies, 
decisions, and actions of their departments and agencies, and hold office for as long as they 
have the confidence of the Prime Minister (Cabinet Office, 2011b; GOV.UK, 2018a).  
As the political head of the department, the Minister is ‘to answer to the legislature and through 
the legislature, to the public, both for his or her personal acts and for the acts of departmental 
subordinates’ (Larson and Coe, 1999: 5). However, individual and collective ministerial 
responsibilities are largely realized through the Permanent Secretary (Kernaghan and Siegel, 
1995). Thus, the quality of relationship between the Secretary of State and the Permanent 
Secretary is critical for the effective performance of the Secretary of State (Rhodes, 2011).  
Since 2005, this critical relationship has been tested by Ministers’ tenure of appointment, which 
has significantly decreased. By 2010, eleven out of nineteen departments (excluding HMRC) 
had experienced a change of Secretary of State (or senior minister in the case of the Cabinet 
Office) (Dash, 2012) on average, every 1.3 years (HC, 2007). Warning of the downside of 
short-term tenure, Tony Crosland revealed that ‘it took at least two years for a Minister to 
become conversant with the core work and policy issues of a Department’ (Ribbins and 
Sherratt, 2013: 106). Others concur and note that it takes time for the Minister to appreciate 
that the Civil Service is impartial and acts with honesty, objectivity, impartiality, and integrity, 
has a key constitutional function to perform, and is critical to delivering on the policies of the 
elected government (HCPASC, 2007; Cabinet Office, 2011a; 2011b). 
Thus, the role of the Minister is multi-faceted. Ministers are elected representatives as well as 
MPs; they are members of their political parties; they represent their party in the media; they 
are members of the Cabinet; and are required to fully engage in the policies pursued and the 







Since the 19th-century foundation of the modern Civil Service, civil servants (including the 
administrative head of the department or Ministry, the Permanent Secretary) were and are 
considered as politically impartial and independent of government, and work in central 
government departments, agencies, and non-departmental public bodies (HCPASC, 2007). 
Despite the Permanent Secretary being a career civil servant who has tenure beyond the life of 
any particular government (Cabinet Office, 2011b), since May 2010, the turnover amongst 
‘permanent’ secretaries has been substantial (Grube and Howard, 2016). For example, the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), Cabinet Office, and Department for Transport (DfT) have each 
had four Permanent Secretaries (including acting heads of departments (GOV.UK, 2018b). The 
overall departmental average is two Permanent Secretaries in the two and a half years since the 
May 2016 election (excluding acting heads of departments; GOV.UK, 2018b). This compares 
with two Permanent Secretaries per department over the entire period from 1997 to May 2010 
(excluding acting heads of department; GOV.UK, 2018b). Thus, the traditional view that ‘the 
presentation of integrity, fearlessness, and independence of thought and utterance in their 
private communion with Ministers’. (Tomlin, 1931:1268) is considered to be slowly eroding 
(Hustedt and Salomonsen, 2014). 
Irrespective of employment background, the Civil Service Management Code (Civil Service, 
2015) set out the standards of behaviour expected of civil servants based on the values of 
integrity, honesty, objectivity, and impartiality. Moreover, it obliges them to ‘serve the 
government of the day, whatever its political persuasion’, to the best of their ability ‘in a way 
which maintains political impartiality’ (Civil Service, 2015: 1). The requirement is for civil 
servants to be appropriately responsive to the Secretary of State in offering advice on policy, 
systems, and processes as well as be proactive in working with the ministerial office and special 





Office, 2018). Permanent Secretaries working with the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil 
Service are collectively responsible for supporting proper and effective decision-making, the 
implementation of the government’s cross-departmental and departmental priorities, and the 
exercise of the efficient use of resources (GOV.UK, 2016). Thus, the Permanent Secretary is 
required to be ‘managing up’ – engaging with the Secretary of State; ‘managing down’ – 
leading his/her department, building capacity; and ‘managing out’ – engaging in network 
(meta-)governance (Van Dorp and ‘t Hart, 2019). 
Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary Relationship 
The traditional view of the public servant engagement with Ministers within the Westminster 
system, based on a clear separation of roles (Hughes et al, 2013), does not reflect actual practice 
or reality of their working relationship (Hughes et al, 2013). Svara (2001: 180) argues that the 
‘political–administration dichotomy’ is a ‘myth’ and that the work is enacted through ‘ongoing 
interaction, reciprocal influence, and mutual deference between elected officials and 
administrators’. Overeem (2012), on the other hand, suggests that the political–administrative 
dichotomy should be replaced by interdependence, complementarity, and bargaining.  
Such adaptability, dependent on role-based discretion is seen as opportunity for manoeuvre, as 
rules and regulations will not provide appropriate guidelines for action or direction (Dworkin, 
1978). Discretion and freedom requires the role holder to assess and to distinguish between 
relevant and non-relevant aspects in a situation and make considered appropriate decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty (Molander et al, 2012). The ability to effectively perform 
discretion and exercise good practical judgment requires one to integrate theoretical 
knowledge, practical skills, and deeply rooted values in order to be capable of functioning in a 





As top civil servants, Permanent Secretaries hold high role-based discretion and, as such, 
significantly shape their department according to the circumstances they face and the 
organizational outcomes they consider appropriate (Riddell, 2014). As part and parcel of the 
role, the Permanent Secretary is the key link between the Minister and the service offered to 
the public (HCPAS, 2007). In this sense, senior public servants are the bridge between the 
political and managerial space and, as such, it is at their discretion how they address the 
ambiguity of being compliant or providing challenge, issue by issue, Minister by Minister. 
Both the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary need to find ways through tensions 
between being in a position of authority and yet being circumscribed, formally and informally, 
by other stakeholders, such as the media, the constituency, the political party and the public, as 
well as institutional rules and protocols (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018). 
Trust between the Secretary of State and the Permanent Secretary is of vital importance, but of 
itself is not sufficient (Haldenby et al, 2013). Effectively facilitating the involvement of other 
stakeholders, such as SpAds, has become an equal necessity. 
Further, the recent churn of Secretaries of State and Permanent Secretaries has meant a ‘lack 
of continuity and lack of collective memory’ (HCPASC, 2013: 6). Commentators suggest that 
the length of tenure in the role is as important as the quality of the relationship between the two 
(Purnell and Lewis, 2012; Ribbins and Sherratt, 2014). Effectively adapting to changes of 
Secretaries of State and their priorities, which impact on the party, department, Cabinet, PM, 
Parliament, media, SpAds, constituents, and other stakeholders, has placed extensive pressure 
on the Permanent Secretary (Rutter, 2017; Cooper, 2019). Thus, shaping a sound working and 
supportive relationship between the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary is recognized 







In order to gain a wider perspective on the impact of the Secretary of State–Permanent 
Secretary relationship within the Westminster government system, the sampling frame for the 
study included senior officials and politicians. Eighty-one confidential interviews were 
conducted with Secretaries of State, junior ministers, SpAds, Permanent Secretaries, directors 
general (DGs) and other civil servants, NEDs on departmental boards, Chairs/CEOs of arm’s 
length bodies and outsourcing contractors, examining the nature and contrasting experiences 
of the Secretary of State–Permanent Secretary relationship and its impact on policy delivery. 
Interviews were conducted between November 2017 and March 2018.  
All interviews were undertaken on the condition of anonymity. The one-to-one in-depth 
interviews provided material that enabled us to analyse as well as theorize the nuance of the 
relationship between Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary.  
Following data collection, a post-interview transcript analysis was pursued, encompassing a 
detailed search for underlying themes that was manually coded. All text was read several times 
and statements that appeared to be revealing about the phenomenon in question were 
highlighted (Van Manen, 1990). A detailed examination of the emergent thematic list enabled 
the recognition of regularities and patterns in the empirical material and the further 
categorization of these codes into sub-themes and grand themes (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
Study Findings 
Data analysis revealed one overarching theme: the discretionary nature of the two roles of 
Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary; and two emergent characteristics that shape 
ministerial behaviour: preference for soft or hard evidence and a low or high level of personal 





the building of an analytical model to scrutinize ministerial orientation; that is, mindset and 
resultant behaviour. 
Discretionary Leadership Roles 
Exercising discretion, be that judgement in decision-making or action to be taken, is already 
recognized as an essential part of the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary roles 
(Williams, 1985). Discretion allows and demands flexibility when considering individual 
circumstances (Davis, 1969), where the ability to choose between options is at the core of 
discretion. However, the inherent concern with the high levels of discretion is that outcomes 
can be both positive and/or negative (Dillman, 2002).  The Secretary of State in particular has 
considerable discretion limited only by the ‘law, parliamentary support and, increasingly media 
coverage’ (Van Dorp and ‘t Hart, 2019: 979). 
The breadth of discretion available to the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary emerged 
from this study as extensive. One Permanent Secretary emphasized the criticality of exercising 
discretion in terms of policy-making and delivery, that of enabling the government to realize 
its objectives. 
‘…shape the priorities of that government in a way that optimizes the chance that 
the government will be successful in delivering its goals on behalf of the people 
who’ve elected it.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
This was emphasized by Lord King (2006): ‘we on the Nolan Committee made very clear that 
there should be discretion for Ministers, but the Ministers then had to take responsibility’. The 
focus here is on how Ministers balance their time and attention between prerogatives and 





‘Of course, I listen to views of officials and most times they are well thought through. But 
then I need to set direction and I state this is the way we are going even if that is opposite 
to the advice given. At the end of the day I decide.’  (Secretary of State) 
Officials supported this statement. 
 ‘Ministers rely on civil servants to provide the detailed information necessary 
for them to make informed decisions.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
Irrespective of the interests, responsibilities, and accountabilities that need to be 
reconciled, all participants in this study concurred that positively engaging with the 
Secretary of State is critical but demanding. Civil servants outlined the nature of the 
challenge to ‘get onto the Minister’s wave length’ (Permanent Secretary) in order to 
navigate through the urgency versus realism tension. It was equally recognized that 
not only does the Permanent Secretary need to read the ‘mind of the Minister’, it is the 
Permanent Secretary who has to continually adapt to the Minister.  
‘I need to interpret what the politicians are trying to do, and then assist them 
to form the strategies which later impact on my Department.’ (Permanent 
Secretary) 
‘My role requires me to facilitate the expressed wish of the Minister. They are 
the representatives of the people and we are to serve them and the people.’ 
(Permanent Secretary) 
 ‘Devotion better describes the Permanent Secretary.’ (Director General) 
In fact, devotion to the Minister emerged as paramount in the mind and actions of 





Officials described considerable pressure of urgency to meet political goals facing the 
Secretary of State. 
‘I got it wrong and I had to say Minster [sic] we all let you down. I just did not 
read the situation well and the only one exposed is you, the Minister. I will not 
let her down again.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
Permanent Secretaries outlined that the focus of their discretionary judgement was to 
draw on their astuteness to handle situations of considerable tension, work through 
formal and informal boundaries, and be conscious of the political consequences of 
advice given and actions taken and/or resisted. Their aim was to read the Minister’s 
orientation and through so doing build a relationship of respect.  
‘Some of my colleagues humble themselves. I more draw on the facts in front 
of me and been seen as confronting. Both approaches can work because the 
Minister realising his/her goals is all our concern.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
All interviewees concurred that the Minister’s exposure to broad public accountability 
allowed for little sympathy to the slower, painstaking, but accurate scrutiny undertaken 
by the official of the policy landscape. Thus, the need is for the official to deeply 
understand the Minister and have them better engaged to work through the misaligned 
interests being faced, all to effectively deliver on policy. 
Engaging with the Secretary of State 
Effectively engaging with the Secretary of State emerged as the central consideration for how 
the respondents in this study utilized their discretionary choices. Irrespective of role and 
background, the study participants emphasized paying attention to how both the Minister drew 





their relationship. Hard evidence was defined as formalized communications, such as reports, 
accounting statements, opinion polls, which are detached and appear logical and objective 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Russell (1914). Soft data, on the other hand, was described as less formal 
information, such as feelings, opinions, ‘how things are done around here’, which certain 
consider subjective (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Confidence at the level of the individual is the strength with which a person believes that a 
specific statement, opinion, or decision is the best possible they can offer and/or deliver 
(Peterson and Pitz, 1988; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). The American psychologist and 
philosopher, James (2017), noted that few people succeed without a degree of confidence. 
Evidence indicates that when feeling confident, people develop more positive and productive 
relationships (Exworthy and Robinson, 2001).   
These two characteristics – types of evidence and confidence levels – are identified by the 
study participants as driving four distinct patterns of orientation and behaviour, which impact 
the tension (positively or negatively) between the urgency of the Minister to execute policy 
and the realistic appraisal of the blockages and hindrances to policy execution undertaken by 







Figure 1: Minister orientation 
Self-absorbed 
Certain Secretaries of State were viewed by other Secretaries of State, junior ministers, civil 
servants, SpAds, Chairs, and CEOs of arm’s length agencies as overly self-absorbed but 
displaying a discipline for drawing on hard data to enable decision-making.  
 ‘[Y]ou’re trying to plan for literally the next three months, for the next six, for a 
year, and then beyond, and you’ve just got to keep all of that ticking over and trying 
to also instil a bit of your legacy in the department.’ (Secretary of State) 
The perceived or expressed lack of confidence was viewed as the reason for being overly 
self-conscious. 
 ‘I’ve got a very hyperactive Secretary of State, he’s very ambitious, at times he is 
not sure of himself and that means that sometimes he gets frustrated at the pace of 
change that we’re able to execute for him. How do we make him understand what’s 






Despite Ministers’ preference for hard data, certain civil servants outlined that to capture 
a Minister’s attention, presenting him/her in a positive light is critical. 
‘I presented the facts and got thrown out of his office. Some time later I presented 
again but this time made sure the Minister looked good. The SpAd who was at the 
original meeting said, “But this is what you said the last time so why the positive 
response today?” I pointed out how this time the Minister could see his positive 
image shine through.’ (Director General) 
In order to realize positive engagement with Ministers displaying a self-absorbed 
orientation, civil servants report their focus is on the Secretary of State being viewed in a 
positive light. ‘As long as he looks good’, commented one Permanent Secretary, ‘all else 
falls into place’. 
Insecure  
Ministers with low confidence and with a reliance on soft data are reported as tending to 
surround themselves with SpAds and others supportive of them to ‘bolster their ego’ (Secretary 
of State). It was reported that the Minister’s insecurity and reliance on soft data leaves them 
overly dependent on the comment or opinion of the last person they met. Evidence-based 
conversations are acceptable if the Minister feels comfortable and receives acclaim.  
‘It’s change again. Someone got to him [Secretary of State], made him feel good and 
that he would look good. We need to be even closer to him because what’s next is not 
in his favour.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
Discussion that veers towards damage to the ‘public interest’ and/or making the tough decision 





‘I still blame myself. I thought he/she [Secretary of State] was confident and 
outgoing and so I prepared public meetings and forums where he/she could shine. 
To my horror he/she was insecure and hated the big meeting. He/she likes small 
gatherings around him/her. To this day I am sure he/she has not forgiven me for 
leaving him/her feeling exposed and vulnerable.’ (Director General; he/she is used 
in order to maintain confidentiality) 
‘… it’s the insecurity that in all my experience of ministers is what makes them 
difficult to deal with. … they’re much more vulnerable to thinking that you might 
be trying to get one over on them, and that’s the other thing that propels me to keep 
working at the relationship, because if there’s a poor relationship with me then it’s 
much harder for everyone else.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
Civil servants, SpAds, and certain NEDs on departmental boards described the lengths 
they go to to have the Minister feel comfortable. Paying attention to appropriately reading 
the Minister is backed by selective use of language, softness of tone, ‘engineering settings 
where the Minister shines’ (Director General), and not being economical with flattery. In 
fact, expressions of flattery and displays of loyalty are reported as critical to being trusted. 
Thus, unquestioning loyalty is a prime requirement to win the Minister’s trust.  If all else 
fails, then the imperative is to shield the vulnerabilities of the Minister from the public 
gaze. 
Communicator  
Civil servants, Chairs and CEOs of arm’s length agencies, and departmental board NEDs 
described Ministers exuding confidence and who easily interrelate as reliant on soft data, 
informal conversation, ‘chats at the bar’ to build relationships. Yet, the informal nature 





commitments made. Due to the affinities and emotional nature of interactions, the last 
person to see the Minister may be the one who wins the argument or their trust. Confident 
Ministers who effectively communicate through soft data rely on feedback concerning 
their impact on others. In this sense, SpAds are an invaluable source of opinion 
concerning the Minister’s popularity and acceptability. 
‘I do let him know the impact he has made. Keeping him on track is not so easy as 
he gets caught up in the moment.’ (SpAd) 
Still, a change of mind on the Minister’s part concerning opinions expressed on their 
views or their trust of others is commonplace.  
‘[Y]ou have Ministers saying to us, well we didn’t mean exactly that, or they 
look a bit surprised that we’ve taken every word so seriously.’ (Director General) 
‘I suppose people are worried about the reputational risk … things are under 
considerable scrutiny.’ (Secretary of State) 
The approach adopted by civil servants, SpAds, and others to positively engage with 
the communicative Minister is to ‘stay close to them’ (SpAd). This was seen as ‘not 
too onerous a task’ (Permanent Secretary), as the confident and positive nature of the 
Minister made for easy and enjoyable interaction. 
‘Great to be with and you do not have to try too hard, just don’t put too much 
trust to what he says.’ (Permanent Secretary describing his interaction with a 
Minister) 
Rationalist  
In the eyes of civil servants, arm’s length agency Chairs and CEOs, and departmental board 





SpAds or other aids and freely enters into debate. It is these ministers who show they are well 
able to accept and logically work through feedback and comment. At times their personal style 
may be too confrontational, but that is due to being evidence-driven and, as a consequence, less 
attentive to making others feel comfortable. The greatest criticism of SpAds and their political 
masters comes from the rationalist orientated Secretary of State. An intolerance for other 
Ministers who exhibit a lack of confidence was also forthcoming. 
‘Why all those SpAds around him? The reason is to protect him as he lacks 
confidence.’ (Secretary of State describing another Secretary of State) 
‘Certain Ministers pick up knowledge very rapidly and some are capable of 
assimilating and retaining astonishing amounts of detail. They just do not suffer 
fools gladly.’ (Permanent Secretary) 
Civil servants in particular expressed their admiration for the rationalist Minister due to their 
capacity to think through the challenges they face, draw on evidence in order to construct a 
compelling argument, and encourage open and at times confrontational forms of 
communication, all to get to ‘the heart of the matter’. 
‘It’s hardly complexity. It’s almost logic, reasoning, problem solving, 
judgement, but most of all drawing on evidence and analysis.’ (Permanent 
Secretary) 
 ‘I was always quite keen to hear it, if I was talking nonsense or heading off in 
a foolish direction, I wanted to be told frankly, and occasionally I was and 






Engaging with the rationalist Minister requires drawing on evidence in order to be 
focused on the task at hand.  
‘Whatever is required to do the job, that’s me.’ (Secretary of State) 
‘I just always took the view that there are a lot of very able people in the civil 
service, and I want their opinions.’ (Secretary of State) 
Although favoured and in certain cases held in awe by civil servants, NEDs, and Chairs 
and CEOs of arm’s length agencies, the rationalist Minister was not so favoured by 
other Ministers. Their task orientation, disciplined and systematic approach to running 
meetings, and use of evidence left certain colleagues feeling inadequate, unable to 
contribute, or just ‘cold’. 
‘He really puts people off, but knows how to drive things through. Surprised to 
hear you think he is good but I can see why you say that.’ (Conversation with 
Chair of a Parliamentary Committee concerning a Secretary of State) 
 The rationalist Minister induced defensiveness and resentment more from other 
politicians than officials. 
‘I really had to do something. It was not the principle but his style. No patience 
and almost contempt for those who could not keep up’. (SpAd describing their 
involvement with their Secretary of State) 
Conclusion 
The challenge of realizing engagement across misaligned interests through the exercise of 
discretionary judgement is no new area of study. The Secretary of State–Permanent Secretary 





third and private sector institutions (Kakabadse et al, 2010). The Chair’s effective leadership 
of the board is vital in limiting unwelcome and self-seeking executive and director’s influence 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). In order to provide for effective oversight, the Chair may 
adopt a control approach, which minimizes CEO entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992). In contrast, a collaborative approach is rooted in stewardship, 
which focuses less on the risk of opportunism and more on the gains to be made from trust and 
co-operation (Davis et al 1997). Yet whichever approach is adopted, the ‘chemistry’ of the 
Chairman–CEO relationship is fundamental to effective board oversight of the enterprise and 
the management’s capability to effectively pursue strategy.  
Similar to the Secretary of State–Permanent Secretary relationship, the dual components of 
drawing on evidence and the emotionality underpinning confidence emerged from the study of 
the Chair–CEO relationship (Kakabadse et al, 2010). Whether private entities or government, 
in both contexts, the sensitivities and subtleties of the relationship have dramatic policy and 
strategy effects. It is a moot point as to which does greater harm: a relationship breakdown 
between the two, or them working through an ever-deteriorating relationship, not able or 
willing to speak ‘truth to power’. It is little wonder that tension is inherent in these interactions. 
Determining the necessary steps to take for effective policy delivery, explicit and implicit 
negotiation of boundaries and the meeting of minds require continual attention.  What is clear 
is that exercising discretion is vital for the purpose of adaptability and efficient decision-
making.  
The difference between the apex of a company and that of government is that the Chair–CEO 
relationship requires both to try to make it work (Kakabadse et al, 2006). In government and 
in contrast to the private/third sectors, it is clear that it is the Permanent Secretary who must be 





sided love affair’, penetrating intellectual consideration is required to determine how to make 
the relationship function, followed by an exercise of deep sensitivity to win the Secretary of 
State’s confidence. The study reported in this paper has revealed the efforts and lengths senior 
officials will go to in order for the Secretary of State to succeed, and be seen to succeed, in 
their delivery of policy. Such attentiveness hardly exists in any other institution.  
Working through the challenges to effective policy delivery has officials display great concern 
for meeting the Minister’s expectations and concerns. In fact, reading the Minister in order to 
adjust style, approach, and argument to be presented emerges as the most critical exercise of 
discretion. This study highlights that the accurate reading of the Minister involves 
consideration of their preference for type of evidence (soft or hard) and their level of confidence 
to publicly face up to and work through contingencies. Our findings also draw attention to the 
Permanent Secretary’s painful and continuously self-regulating balancing act of 
responsiveness to the Secretary of State, often invisible to his/her political master. What is 
equally emphasized is that to ‘misread the Minister’ can easily lead to a breakdown of 
relationships, thus damaging policy delivery. In fact, the unspoken assumption was of civil 
servants’ versatility of style to adjust according to what it takes to be on the Minister’s wave 
length. 
Overall, little evidence emerged that the Secretary of State appreciated the concern and deep 
level of service provided by the official for their Minister. The intellectual capabilities of senior 
civil servants are identified by Ministers as appreciated and respected. However, the lengths 
senior civil servants go to in order that the Secretary of State maintains the confidence of the 
public to lead through policy delivery is seemingly not recognized by the Minister. With little 





order to effectively and efficiently deliver policy, the criticality of accurately ‘reading the 
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